The available budget for the NHS seems to be a fairly constant topic of conversation within healthcare. Indeed, it formed a large part of the discussion surrounding the recent general election. Given we live in a world of limited resources for healthcare, there are various arguments surrounding how best to use the available budget.
One notion put forward is that of personal or voluntary responsibility. This argues that individuals who have put themselves at risk through their voluntary decisions must take responsibility for the full outcomes of their decision. Any negative consequences of their action are their responsibility and if they place another individual at risk who has not made a choice to be in this situation, then the person who has made the choice forfeits their right to equitable treatment.
An example might help illustrate the point this argument is trying to make. Organ donation is a simple example of the use of finite health resources, like the countries’ budget for healthcare. Consider the situation where you have two patients waiting for a liver transplant. One, John, is a 60-year-old man with Alcohol-Related End-Stage Liver Disease (ARESLD), who needs a new liver after several decades of drinking. The other is Marjorie, a 62-year-old woman who has End-Stage Liver Disease as a result of an infected blood transfusion she received several years ago. The blood transfusion was required due to an accident that she did not cause. Both are diagnosed and told they require a transplant at the same time. Who should have the priority if a liver were to become available?
John now needs this transplant as a result of his life choices (if we for the moment take it in isolation of social factors such as addiction), while Marjorie needs this transplant through no fault of her own as she is if anything a victim in this situation. The principle of voluntary responsibility would argue that John has through his actions caused his illness and thus created his need for this limited resource. Not only that but in doing so, he has put Marjorie at risk by creating competition for a resource that she needs. Therefore, John should relinquish his claim to the resources, the liver transplant.
This might be seen to reflect some natural intuition in this situation. But is this really fair?
The ethicist J McMahan likens this scenario to that of killing in self-defence. He argues that the key determinate in the right to kill in self-defence is the moral responsibility of the individual threatening you. Thus, though he recognises in this situation John is not directly attacking Marjorie, he is morally responsible for his actions that have created a direct threat to her life. McMahan would argue that by creating this risk to Marjorie’s life through his choices, John must pay the cost of his actions and is morally required to save her by relinquishing his claim to the organ.
On this argument it seems right to prioritise patients who are not morally responsible for their need for an organ over those who are responsible. In making certain choices they have threatened the life of someone else and so have diminished their claim to be treated relative to the other individual. This is not to say that they shouldn’t be treated, but in situations where there are limited resources priority must be given to those who are not responsible for their need.
This can be seen as an application of the principles of Luck Egalitarianism. Luck Egalitarianism is built around the idea of equal opportunity, so that any inequalities that exist between individuals are only due to their own choices. It aims to eliminate the brute luck element in life which causes individuals to exist unequally due to factors beyond their control such as race, the wealth of the family they are born into, the opportunities available to them, or the level of nurturing they receive as a child. These factors can mean that individuals start life unequally, which is unfair. Dworkin proposed that people should be provided an equal starting point, therefore the only inequalities they should experience should come as a result of their own choices for which they can be held accountable. Therefore, everyone should be provided the same right to healthcare in the first place, and then in making choices that damage their health individuals waive their right to equal access to healthcare. Personal responsibility can then be seen as the cost of free choice and its consequences are the cost of being autonomous adults.
So far this seems to be an argument related to fairness. Surely then this principle should be applied fairly to the whole of healthcare, and to all decisions that create a demand on limited healthcare resources? Any choices to put oneself at risk should deprioritise you relative to individuals who haven’t take such risks. Therefore, one’s choice to drink should be seen in regards to healthcare as the same as one’s choice to climb a mountain, or go over the speed limit, or indeed to become pregnant (provided there was some choice to engage in sex knowing the risk of this action).
That is not to say the weight of the decisions is the same. For instance, an injury caused by a single moments recklessness in a car has had less chance to be stopped than years of heavy drinking. However, in both situations the individual has made a choice to prioritise something over their health and so resources should arguably, based on this principle, go to individuals who have not put themselves at risk.
If this principle is applied, as it should be in an argument about fairness, then an operation for a liver transplant needed due to ARESLD could only go ahead if there were enough surgeons to perform all the operations that were not needed as the result of lifestyle choices. Funding for gastric bands and weight loss surgery could only be provided once all genetic disease had been cured. This principle must be applied completely or not at all. Otherwise you are prioritising based on social decisions, not moral ones, of reprehensible behaviour, and creating inequality in trying to provide equal and fair access to healthcare resources.
A study by Ubel highlighted that actually we are more likely to prioritise based on social reprehensible choices than simple personal responsibility. The study asked individuals to decide who to give a heart transplant to out of a range of patients; some were IV drug users, some smokers, some ate high fat diets and some had a healthy lifestyle. His study found that people assigned a lower priority to the individuals with the most socially reprehensible lifestyle, regardless of whether they had a better prognosis or their lifestyle was the cause of their illness. IV drug users received significantly fewer organs than any other patient irrespective of all other factors. Yet the most common justification for their decision was that patients who caused their own illness should not receive equal priority. It would seem then that many people believe individuals are just less worthy of scarce resources, rather than it being due to the fact that they caused their own illness.
If people are unwilling to apply the principle of personal responsibility in all situations then surely it is morally wrong and unfair to apply it only in situations where society judges the decisions reprehensible.
However, if one is willing to accept the wholesale application of the principle of voluntary responsibility then there would need to be some way of determining the degree of responsibility for ill-health. For one to be fully responsible for their choice they must be aware of full effects of said choice, be free from undue influence and have a full range of options for the choice they are making. It seems reasonable to dispute that this is the case with a lot of lifestyle decisions. Health education in the UK is out of date and has one of the lowest spending priorities despite it being an effective tool for combatting illness. Therefore, the current way we provide individuals with information on the risks of certain lifestyle choices is failing to connect with the individuals it is aiming to educate. If we are to deprioritise individuals for poor health choices, there must be fair provision for these individuals to be educated or made aware of the risks they take when making certain lifestyle choices. It would be the duty of the government limiting access to healthcare based on lifestyle choices to ensure that the risks would be fairly advertised and the information on the risks the individuals are taking to be publicly and readily available.
It could be argued that actually the opposite occurs and the government actively allows for the promotion of these risky lifestyle choices through advertising. For example, it has been shown that children see as many as 12 advertisements for junk food within a single hour television viewing. This level of advertising, and thus promotion for lifestyle choices that have a links to ill health in later life, would indicate that instead of proper education on the risk of certain choices there is encouragement to make these risky lifestyle choices from an early age. Responsibility should therefore not be placed wholly with the individuals making the choices.
The ability to make healthy choices can also be limited. Health inequalities seem based in structural inequalities, meaning that people from lower socioeconomic backgrounds have a general lower level of health. A study found that individuals born to lower socioeconomic backgrounds had a higher incidence of poor health habits later in life, suggesting that it is not free choice that individuals exercise when making certain lifestyle decisions, but rather a product of their upbringing. While this does not mean that it is impossible for individuals from lower socioeconomic backgrounds to make good health decisions, they are subject to different perceptions of health habits and have different restraints and reinforcements leading them to make choices that are not wholly free, and so they should not be placed with the full burden of responsibility for these decisions.
Luck egalitarianism, to be fair, would seek to rectify these problems, and personal responsibility is a luck egalitarian principle. However, it cannot be applied in one respect and not in another. Every aspect of society would have to shift to luck egalitarianism for this to be fair.
It seems clear that personal responsibility is not a fair or morally sound way on which to distribute the NHS’ limited budget. The fair way to do so must be decided by our wise new government. Yet one thing is clear regardless of whatever way they choose, the NHS needs more money than they can give it.
Kit Stanford




